Might Putin Use Tactical Nukes in Ukraine?

Yes, he might. It may not be 'likely' but is still a greater risk than many realize.

Is it possible that Russia will use chemical, biological or nuclear weapons in Ukraine?

Of course it is!

My view is that it’s not likely Russia will use W.M.D. — I believe the chance is less than 50 percent — but that the risk is still greater than many in the West appreciate. And this would be such a catastrophe that we have to take greater steps to try to deter it.

Putin’s forces are performing poorly in Ukraine, and that creates opportunities: The Financial Times has encouraging reporting about a 15-point peace plan that Russia and Ukraine are discussing. Let’s hope and pray that this comes to pass. But it’s also true that Putin historically has been inclined to double down on bad bets, such as his war in Chechnya, and it’s when he finds himself cornered that he becomes most dangerous.

From Ukraine Defense Ministry

A month ago, many people in Ukraine and the West did not believe that Russia would actually invade Ukraine. “He’s bluffing,” went the refrain. “Putin will be deterred. The costs would be too great.”

But Putin, as we’ve seen, is not easily deterred. And he has already taken the risk of crossing red lines and using chemical weapons, for Russian intelligence officers employed Novichok, a nerve agent, in 2018 against perceived enemies in Salisbury, England, and later against the dissident Aleksei Navalny.

If Putin were facing humiliation in Ukraine, he might be tempted to use chemical or tactical nuclear weapons to try to force a deal on better terms.

 In other words, if Putin feels as if he’s losing a card game, he may prefer to toss the cards in the air and see where they land. A limited tactical nuclear strike has a longstanding place in Russian military thinking, called “escalate to deescalate,” and the idea seems to have initially emerged under Putin in 2000. The idea is simply that Russia is willing to use a limited tactical nuclear strike to resolve a conventional war that amounts to an existential threat.

Western analysts have been unnerved because Russia has alleged without a shred of evidence that Ukraine is secretly working on biological weapons, and this could be used to camouflage Russian use of W.M.D.

The most calamitous possibility would be Putin deciding to use a tactical nuclear weapon. I’m not talking about strategic nuclear warheads raining on Washington and New York. Rather, this is about Russia’s 2,000 tactical nuclear weapons; these are smaller than intercontinental warheads and are used on a battlefield.

A small tactical nuclear weapon, perhaps just an artillery shell, wouldn’t necessarily kill many people, particularly if it were fired at a military target away from a population center. But it would spread radiation and it would be a historic milestone, the first use of a nuclear weapon in conflict since Nagasaki. More alarming, a tactical weapon would be a step toward normalization of nuclear weapons and might lead other countries to build their own nuclear deterrents.

(The current Ukraine war will already be seen by some states as an argument for possessing nuclear weapons. Ukraine had nuclear warheads when it broke off from the Soviet Union, but in the 1990s the international community persuaded it — with some arm-twisting — to give those weapons to Moscow. If Ukraine had kept its nuclear warheads, it would now be safe from Russian invasion.)

Russia has generally been more flexible than the West in its doctrine about use of tactical nuclear weapons, although it is clear that they would be used only in situations considered essential to the nation’s national security. A Congressional Research Service analysis notes:

In mid-2009, when discussing the revision of Russia’s defense strategy that was expected late in 2009 or early 2010, Nikolai Patrushev, the head of Russia’s Presidential Security Council, indicated that Russia would have the option to launch a “preemptive nuclear strike” against an aggressor “using conventional weapons in an all-out, regional, or even local war.” [The published version of the defense strategy did not go that far.]

What we’re now seeing in Ukraine is that Russian forces appear stymied and are responding the way they did in Grozny and Aleppo: turning cities into rubble. As Michael Schwirtz of The New York Times put it today: “the Russian troops bomb, randomly and indiscriminately, striking neighborhoods, hospitals and supermarkets, opting for terror in the absence of military gain.”

Can anyone be confident that if indiscriminate terror fails, Putin will back off rather than doubling down with chemical or biological weapons, or even with a tactical nuclear weapon?

How can we reduce the risk of Putin using W.M.D.? All we can do is rally other countries, particularly China, to warn against such a possibility, especially of a tactical nuke. As a nuclear power, China has a strong interest in preventing any use of tactical nuclear weapons that would lead to proliferation, and China has particular influence over Moscow.

In the meantime, if you’re looking at the images from Eastern Ukraine and thinking this is as bad as it can get — no, it could actually get worse.